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Abstract. The eﬀects of information on market design are explored in a simple
setting where ﬁrms have private information about their correlated ﬁxed costs and the
government aims to maximize its expected revenue conditional on achieving eﬃcient
allocations. Government revenues are higher when the costs are less correlated (or
are more of a private value). The reduced correlation increases the ﬁrms’ information
rents, but a change in the information structure also changes the expected market
structures with positive eﬀects on government revenues. If the government faces
the no-deﬁcit constraint, there are situations where eﬃcient allocations are achieved
under asymmetric information but not under symmetric information.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D4, L1, H8.
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1INTRODUCTION
Government agencies sometimes face the problem of how to allocate production
licenses (or award production contracts) to ﬁrms. The production license or contract
could be for the provision of health-care services, cable services, or recycling services;
for the production of military systems; or, as in the recent FCC spectrum auction in
the U.S., for the provision of new telecommunication services. An important consid-
eration for the government in such situations is whether an allocation mechanism will
choose the most eﬃcient supplier(s). The theory of auctions and competitive bidding
has oﬀered useful insights in this respect. Another interesting issue, one that has
received less attention, is how many production licenses to award, in addition to who
should obtain the licenses. In other words, an allocation mechanism may also need
to choose a desirable structure of the market. This is the issue of market design.1
This paper studies the allocation of production assets by government when the
market structure is endogenously determined. The literature on this issue, pioneered
by Dana and Spier (1994), generally assumes that ﬁrms have private information
about their private valuations.2 We depart from this approach by considering situa-
tions where ﬁrms have private information about a correlated value, such as the cost
of building a network. Under our formulation pure private value and pure common
value will be special cases of our model.3 In addition, in stead of using a social wel-
fare function that assigns some weight to government revenues, we assume that the
government’s objective is to obtain the highest revenue possible conditional on the
allocation being eﬃcient,4 and we discuss what happens if the government cannot
have negative revenues.
We consider a simple model where a government agency needs to decide whether
to issue one, two, or zero production licenses and who may receive a license. Firms
are initially uncertain about their own ﬁxed costs but receive private signals about
the possible values of the costs. We focus on two issues in this simple setting. First,
how does the nature of information structure aﬀect government revenues, conditional
on the allocation being eﬃcient? We show that, when the private signal is uniformly
distributed, the expected government revenue is higher when diﬀerent ﬁrms’ costs are
2more independent, and we identify three eﬀects on government revenues when the
correlation between diﬀerent ﬁrms’ costs decreases: it becomes more diﬃcult for the
government to obtain true reports of cost information from each ﬁrm (an incentive
eﬀect); decreased cost correlation across ﬁrms lowers the lowest cost realization among
diﬀerent ﬁrms, which reduces the expected cost of the ﬁrm(s) awarded the license (a
cost eﬀect); and monopoly becomes more likely, increasing government revenues (a
market structure eﬀect).
Second, how does asymmetric information aﬀect market eﬃciency, if the govern-
ment cannot have negative revenues and hence the equilibrium allocation may not be
fully eﬃcient?5 Our analysis reveals a surprising result: there are parameter values
under which full eﬃciency is not obtained under complete information but is obtained
under asymmetric information! This result has a simple intuition: ﬁrms may have
positive proﬁts in some states of the world but negative proﬁts in the other states,
conditional on the allocation being eﬃcient. Under complete information, the eﬃ-
cient allocation cannot be achieved if that leads to negative proﬁts and if government
revenues cannot be negative. Under asymmetric information, however, the ﬁrms’ in-
centives are pooled and this relaxes the participation constraint, making it possible
to have the eﬃcient allocation without the need for government subsidy.
Our study is closely related to the literature on optimal auction design (cf., My-
erson, 1981). When the goods being auctioned are productive assets or licenses, as
are in our case, additional complications arise because the value of winning to a bid-
der may depend on who else wins and what is the nature of strategic interactions in
a market. This is related to studies on auctions with endogenous valuations, such
as Krishna (1993), Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), Rosenthal and Wang (1996), and
Chen (2000).
In what follows, we conduct our analysis in Section 2, and conclude in Section 3.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3I THE MODEL AND ITS ANALYSIS
A government needs to decide whether to award 0, 1 or 2 licenses to two ﬁrms in a
market. The market will be a monopoly if only one license is awarded, and ﬁrms will
compete in a duopoly if both are awarded licenses.
Assume that Firm i privately observes signal xi in the beginning of the game, for
i =1 ,2, and the ﬁxed costs of ﬁrms 1 and 2 are, respectively:
c1 = αx1 +( 1− α)x2,
c2 = αx2 +( 1− α)x1,
where 1
2 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus, the ﬁrms’ ﬁxed costs are correlated and our formulation
includes pure private value (α = 1) and pure common value (α = 1
2) as special cases.
The ﬁrms’ other costs are normalized to zero. Each ﬁrm learns its (ﬁxed) cost only
after it receives the license.
Assume that x1 and x2 are i.i.d. with c.d.f. F(x) and p.d.f. f(x), where x ∈ [x, ¯ x]
and 0 ≤ x < ¯ x<∞.
Let πm be the monopoly proﬁt and πd the per-ﬁrm duopoly proﬁt, excluding the
ﬁxed costs. Let CSm denote the consumer surplus in the case of monopoly, and CSd
the consumer surplus in the case of duopoly. Then the social surplus in the case of
















so that under some situations a duopoly market structure is eﬃcient and under others
a monopoly market structure is eﬃcient. In addition, for convenience we assume that
πm ≥ ¯ x so that at lease one license will be issued in any eﬃcient allocation.
4As a preliminary step, we characterize the eﬃcient allocations, allocations that
yield the highest social surpluses. We can divide the square of (c1,c 2) ∈ [x, ¯ x]×[x, ¯ x]
into three possible regions according to their social surpluses. (See Figure 1.) The





m) ≡ ˆ c ≥ max{c1,c 2}.
Since 2πd +CSd is generally larger than πm +CSm, region D is a square area from x
to ˆ c, provided that ˆ c>x . In this region, two licenses should be issued under eﬃcient
allocation, because the increase in social beneﬁts by issuing an additional license to
the higher-cost ﬁrm exceeds the additional cost.
The second is the monopoly region M1, where c1 ≤ c2 and W d <W m1. This is
the area above both the 45 degree line and c2 =ˆ c. In this region, only one license
should be issued, and it should be issued to ﬁrm 1 under eﬃcient allocation.
The third is the monopoly region M2, where c1 >c 2 and W d <W m2. This is
the area below the 45 degree line and to the right of c1 =ˆ c. In this region, only one
license should be issued, and it should be issued to ﬁrm 2 under eﬃcient allocation.
Insert Figure 1 about Here.
Recall that c1 = αx1+(1−α)x2 and c2 = αx2+(1−α)x1. We can also depict regions
D, M1, and M2 in (x1,x 2) space. It is easy to see that when α increases, max{c1,c 2}
increases, which means that M1 and M2 expand while D shrinks in (x1,x 2) space.
(See Figure 2.)
Insert Figure 2 about Here.
5We assume that the government aims to maximize its revenue conditional on the
allocation being eﬃcient. This seems a realistic assumption in many situations, for
instance in the case of the spectrum auction in the U.S. According to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC 1999), the regulator of radio spectrum in the
U.S., the ﬁrst core principle of eﬀective spectrum management is to maximize the
eﬃcient use of radio spectrum. Furthermore, as another core principle, allocation
and licensing assignments should be based on marketplace demands. Revenue max-
imization is regarded as less important than eﬃciency. In this regard, we model the
government’s objective as to maximize eﬃciency ﬁrst, and then the revenue raised in
the auction.6
I.1 Government Revenues
We ﬁrst derive the maximum revenue the government can achieve under eﬃcient
allocations. Since xi is ﬁrm i’s private information, we use techniques from the
mechanism design literature and consider direct mechanisms.
Let ti(xi), i =1 ,2, be the expected transfer from ﬁrm i to the government when




d − Exj(ci|(xi,x j) ∈ D,xi)]Pr{D|xi} (1)
+[π
m − Exj(ci|(xi,x j) ∈ Mi,x i)]Pr{Mi|xi}−ti(xi)
≥ [π
d − Exj(ci|(˜ xi,x j) ∈ D,xi)]Pr{D|˜ xi}
+[π
m − Exj(ci|(˜ xi,x j) ∈ Mi,x i)]Pr{Mi|˜ xi}−ti(˜ xi)
≡ Π(˜ xi,x i). (2)
Standard techniques show that Π(˜ xi,x i) is diﬀerentiable in ˜ xi. We focus on the
direct mechanisms where each ﬁrm reports its signal truthfully. Therefore, ˜ xi = xi









Note that, for D,
Exj(ci|(˜ xi,x j) ∈ D,xi)=Exj(αxi +( 1− α)xj|(˜ xi,x j) ∈ D)
= αxi Pr{D|˜ xi} +( 1− α)Exj(xj|(˜ xi,x j) ∈ D),
where
Pr{D|˜ xi} =P r {(˜ xi,x j) ∈ D|˜ xi},
and similarly for Mi. It is easy to verify that Pr{D|xi} +P r {Mi|xi} is decreasing
in xi. An increase in xi would increase ﬁrm i’s cost more than increasing ﬁrm j’s
cost. It decreases the probability of ﬁrm i being the monopoly, and at the same


















is increasing in xi.
Now we verify the second order condition for the above optimization problem.


















As we argue above, the second term is positive. Therefore, the ﬁrst term is negative.
That is, Π(˜ xi,x i) is concave in ˜ xi at ˜ xi = xi, conﬁrming the second order condition
for the optimization.




























Integrating both sides from ¯ x to x,w eh a v e
Π(x,x) − Π(¯ x, ¯ x)=−α
 x
¯ x




(Pr{D|xi} +P r {Mi|xi})dxi
To maximize the transfers the government receives, we set Π(¯ x, ¯ x) = 0. Noting
equation (1), we have
ti(x)=[ π
d − Exj(ci|(x,xj) ∈ D,x)]Pr{D|x} (6)
+[π




(Pr{D|xi} +P r {Mi|xi})dxi.
The expression for tj(x) is identical. It is easy to verify that ti(x) is decreasing in x.










Substituting the expression for ti (x)i n t oa b o v e ,w eh a v es h o w n :
Proposition 1 Conditional on the allocations being eﬃcient, the highest expected
revenue the government can obtain is
R =2 {[π
d − E(ci|(xi,x j) ∈ D)]Pr{D} +[ π






(Pr{D|xi} +P r {Mi|xi})dxidx}.
8The ﬁrst two terms in the braces for R represent ﬁrm i’s proﬁt (net of its costs)
in the cases of duopoly and monopoly, respectively. The government captures these
proﬁts in the optimal mechanism. The third term represents the informational rent
ﬁrm i receives because of its private information. The larger the α, the larger the
informational rent. The government needs to pay this rent in order for ﬁrm i to
reveal its private information. It may appear that the higher the α, the higher will
be the information rents to the ﬁrms and the lower the expected government revenue.
However, a change in α also changes the boundaries of the regions for duopoly and
monopoly. The relationship between α and R is thus more complex. In fact, as
we shall show below, with some additional assumptions on F (·) and on the market
demand, R increases in α.
I.2 The Eﬀect of Cost Correlation and Market Demand on
Government Revenues
One interesting question is how α, which measures the correlation between the two
ﬁrms’ costs, aﬀects government revenues. A higher α means that the ﬁrms’ costs
are more independent, increasing the information rents of the ﬁrms. One may then
think that the government revenue should decrease in a. However, as α increases, the
cost realizations of the two ﬁrms are more likely to be asymmetric and the lower of
these is more likely to be lower, which increases the probability that the monopoly
market structure is chosen and that the cost of the monopolist is lower. These market
structure and cost eﬀects imply that an increase in α also has positive eﬀects on
government revenues. It is thus possible that an increase in α increases government
revenues.
Another interesting question is how the market demand will aﬀect government
revenue. It is perhaps natural to think that an increase in market demand should
increase government revenue. But this turns out to be false. An increase in demand
may change the market structure and aﬀect the government’s revenue adversely.
We have the following proposition.
9Proposition 2 Assume that F (x) is U[0,1], the market demand is given by Q =
β (1 − P), where β ∈ [4,14], and ﬁrms are Cournot competitors when in a duopoly.
Then government revenue is increasing in α and decreasing in β.
Proposition 2 sheds light on how the nature of information structure aﬀects gov-
ernment revenues under eﬃcient allocations. When a ﬁrm’s cost is more dependent
on its own private signal, in a sense the ﬁrm beneﬁts more from its private informa-
tion, which, if the value to be shared between the ﬁrm and the government is ﬁxed,
would imply a lower revenue for the government. But both the value and the number
of licenses are endogenous here, and under the conditions we specify the expected
government revenue is higher when each ﬁrm’s costs depend more on its own private
signal.
Proposition 2 also says that the expected government revenue is lower when market
demand, measured by β, is higher. The endogenous nature of the market structure
is crucial for this result: with higher market demand, it becomes more likely that the
duopoly market structure is eﬃcient; but ﬁrms’ proﬁts are lower under duopoly than
under monopoly, which leads to lower expected government revenues under eﬃcient
allocations.
I.3 Possible Higher Eﬃciency under Asymmetric Informa-
tion
Due to their private information, ﬁrms will receive informational rents. Thus, condi-
tional on achieving eﬃcient allocations, the expected government revenues are lower
under asymmetric information than under symmetric information. In this sense, the
government should prefer to have symmetric information, a situation where both
ﬁrms’ costs are common knowledge. However, asymmetric information sometimes
may also be desirable to a government who faces the constraint of non-negative rev-
enues. In our model, when a ﬁrm does not know the other ﬁrm’s private information,
it knows neither the eﬃcient allocation nor its own cost. The revenue maximizing
10mechanism we analyzed earlier has already (implicitly) made used of this uncertainty.
It pools a ﬁrm’s incentives across diﬀerent states in favor of the government’s revenue.
In the proof of the following proposition, we provide an example in which, condi-
tional on the licenses being allocated eﬃciently, government revenue is positive in the
revenue maximizing mechanism with asymmetric cost information, but it is negative
in some regions of the cost realizations if the cost information is common knowledge.
Proposition 3 Assume that government revenue must be non-negative. There are
situations where eﬃcient allocations are achieved under asymmetric information but
not under symmetric information.
Intuitively, ﬁrms have positive proﬁts in some states of the world but negative
proﬁts in the others, conditional on the allocation being eﬃcient. Under complete
information, the eﬃcient allocation cannot be achieved if that leads to negative ﬁrm
proﬁts and if government revenues cannot be negative. Under asymmetric infor-
mation, however, the ﬁrms’ incentives are pooled, which relaxes the participation
constraint, making it possible to have the eﬃcient allocation without the need for
government subsidies.7
Figure 3 illustrates a region where duopoly is eﬃcient but not proﬁtable. This
region exists as long as πd < ˆ c. The duopoly would not operate in that region unless
they are subsidized by the government. Therefore, in that region, eﬃcient allocation
of licenses cannot be achieved under symmetric information and with the constraint
of non-negative government revenue.
Insert Figure 3 about Here.
We can restate Proposition 3 in another way. Since eﬃcient allocation cannot
be achieved in some region with the non-negative revenue constraint, what can be
achieved must be ineﬃcient in that region. We have the following corollary.
11Corollary 1 Assume that the government is constrained to receive non-negative
revenues. Then there are situations in which eﬃciency is higher under asymmetric
information than under no asymmetric information.
I.4 Auctions as Optimal Mechanisms: Theory and Practice
The optimal mechanism in our model resembles some of the familiar auction formats.
Here, we consider two auction formats, each is equivalent to the optimal mechanism
in subsection 2.1. We shall also discuss the use of such an auction for government
procurement in practice.
Let us ﬁrst consider a “modiﬁed” ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auction. Recall equation
(6). Deﬁne x = ω(b) as the inverse function of
ti(x)
Pr{D|x} +P r {Mi|x}
= b
We have the following:
Remark 1 The revenue maximizing mechanism characterized in Proposition 1 is
equivalent to the following modiﬁed ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auction where a bidder pays
(his own bid) only if he wins. The two ﬁrms submit bids b1 and b2 simultaneously.
If αω(b1)+( 1− α)ω(b2) ≤ ˆ c and αω(b2)+( 1− α)ω(b1)}≤ˆ c, then each ﬁrm wins a
license; if any of the above inequalities does not hold, then only ﬁrm 1 wins a license
if ω(b1) ≤ ω(b2), and only ﬁrm 2 wins a license if ω(b1) >ω (b2).
This remark follows directly from the fact that the proposed auction corresponds
exactly to the optimal mechanism in Proposition 1 in terms of expected transfers and
winning probabilities.
Auctions similar to those in Remark 1 have often been employed by the govern-
ment in procuring goods and services. The United States Department of Defense, for
example, uses auctions to procure a signiﬁcant portion of its weapons that explicitly
leave open the number of producers.
12According to the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy from the Depart-
ment of Defense of the United States (Department of Defense, 2005), the procurement
agency can “make multiple awards for the same indeﬁnite requirement in situations
where multiple ﬁrms are capable of delivering similar, but not necessarily identical,
products to meet the needs of the Government and provide alternatives for ordering
oﬃces. Ordering oﬃces then have the choice of selecting the product and ﬁrm that
best meet their needs. ... ... [For] supplies or services other than advisory and as-
sistance services, give preference to making multiple awards, unless [the procurement
agency] determines that a single award is appropriate. ” Furthermore, “award of
requirements for an individual line item may be split between two or more sources.
The size of each portion of the split or a method for calculating the split should be
established in the solicitation. Every possible eﬀort should be made to assure that
any amount awarded is an economic production quantity. Multiple sourcing is neces-
sary to maintain competitive sources for a product that would otherwise be available
only from one source.”
For example, the online newsletter “Contract” (Department of Defense, 1998) de-
scribed a case of split oﬀers. “Raytheon Systems Company, Ft. Wayne, Ind., is being
awarded a $21,749,920 split, ﬁrm-ﬁxed-price contract to procure 22,751 AN/SSQ-
62E sonobuoys and associated data. ...Sparton Defense Electronics, DeLeon Springs,
Fla., is being awarded a $5,258,478 split, ﬁrm-ﬁxed-price contract to procure 3,000
AN/SSQ-62E sonobuoys and associated data.... [These contracts were] competitively
procured with two proposals solicited and two oﬀers received. This is a split procure-
ment under Class Justiﬁcation and Approval Number CR 01240, based on a Federal
Acquisition Regulation 6.302-2 citing industrial mobilization. It is customary prac-
tice to split procurements in the sonobuoy program to meet industrial mobilization
requirements. ”
There are also cases where split awards do not materialize. In the Department of
the Navy of U.S.A. (1998), a protest was logged by one of the bidders because the
government agency did not make a split award in the procurement of waterborne hull
cleaning and associated services. The protest was denied because the agency did not
have to make a split award.
13Alternatively to the auction in Remark 1, we can consider a more direct sealed-
bid, all-pay auction. Let the inverse of the transfer function (6) be x = χ(b). Note
that x = χ(b) is a decreasing function. We have the following:
Remark 2 The revenue maximizing mechanism characterized in Proposition 1 is also
equivalent to the following sealed-bid, all-pay auction where bidders pay their own bids
regardless of winning or not. The two ﬁrms submit bids b1 and b2 simultaneously. If
αχ(b1)+( 1− α)χ(b2) ≤ ˆ c and αχ(b2)+( 1− α)χ(b1)}≤ˆ c, then each ﬁrm wins a
license; if any of the above inequalities does not hold, then only ﬁrm 1 wins a license
if b1 ≥ b2, and only ﬁrm 2 wins a license if b1 <b 2.
Remark 2 also follows directly from the fact that the proposed auction corresponds
exactly to the optimal mechanism in Proposition 1 in terms of transfers and winning
probabilities.
When α = 1, the mechanism in Remark 2 resembles a simple sealed-bid, all-pay
auction with maximum price ˆ t – a bid of ˆ t or higher will be guaranteed a license. If a
ﬁrm submits a lower price, it wins only if the other ﬁrm submit an even lower price.
In this auction, there are three outcomes. First, both ﬁrms submit the maximum
price ˆ t. In this case, each ﬁrm wins a license. Second, one ﬁrm submits the maximum
price, and the other ﬁrm submits a lower price. In this case, the ﬁrst ﬁrm wins a
license but the second ﬁrm does not. Third, no ﬁrm buys at or submits the highest
price. In this case, the ﬁrm with the higher bid will win.
Note that there is a gap between the maximum price and the rest (which are at
most ti(ˆ c) in (8)). This happens in equilibrium because bidding the maximum price
guarantees winning a license with probability one, even if the other ﬁrm bids at the
same price. However, bidding an amount lower than the maximum price implies a
discrete drop in winning probability – the ﬁrm loses if the other ﬁrm bids at the
maximum price (which occurs with a strictly positive probability).
In general, a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed cost depends on the other ﬁrm’s signal. The allocation
of licenses is according to Figure 2. When both ﬁrms’ signals are low (so both ﬁrms’
costs are low), each ﬁrm wins a license. When one ﬁrm’s signal is low but the other
14ﬁrm’s signal is high (so one ﬁrm’s cost is low and the other ﬁrm’s cost is high), the
ﬁrm with the lower signal (and thus lower cost) wins the license.
II CONCLUSION
The design of a market is aﬀected by the nature of information. This study explores
this issue by considering a simple setting where ﬁrms have private information about
their correlated ﬁxed costs and the government aims to maximize its expected revenue
conditional on achieving eﬃcient allocations. We ﬁnd that government revenues tend
to be higher when the costs are less correlated (or a ﬁrm’s private information is more
about a private value). While the ﬁrms’ information rents would increase as they can
learn more from their private information, a change in the information structure also
changes the expected market structures, and the latter eﬀect dominates under certain
conditions. We also ﬁnd that, if the government faces the no-deﬁcit constraint, there
are situations where the allocation is eﬃcient under asymmetric information but not
under symmetric information, because there is “pooling” of proﬁts under asymmetric
information that can make government subsidies unnecessary.
When ﬁrms’ private information is about a correlated value, the problem of mar-
ket design is generally very complicated. Our modest goal in this study has been to
consider a particular setting that allows us to gain some insights about the possible ef-
fects of information on the outcomes of resource allocations in a government-designed
market. To study these eﬀects in more general settings remains an interesting area
for future research.
III APPENDIX: PROOFS






3, pm = 1
2, CSd =
2β
9 , and CSm =
β
8. The duopoly region D is characterized by
D = {(c1,c 2):c1 ≥ c2, 2π
d + CS
d − c1 − c2 ≥ π
m + CS
m − c2}
∪{(c1,c 2):c1 <c 2, 2π
d + CS
d − c1 − c2 ≥ π
m + CS
m − c1}




m ≥ αx1 +( 1− α)x2}




m ≥ αx2 +( 1− α)x1}.
The monopoly region M1 is characterized by
M1 = {(c1,c 2):c1 <c 2,π
m + CS
m − c1 >π
d + CS
d − c1 − c2}
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It is straight-forward to verify that R is increasing in α and decreasing in β.
16Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that the market demand is Q = β (1 − P),
where β ∈ (4¯ x,8¯ x), 0 ≤ x < 1
2¯ x, and ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors if the market
structure is a duopoly. Then πm =
β










8 ∈ (x, ¯ x) and
πd < ˆ c. Thus there are situations where eﬃcient allocation cannot be achieved under
symmetric information.
To show that for some of these situations eﬃcient allocation can nevertheless be
achieved under asymmetric information, consider the case of α = 1; that is, ﬁrms’
costs are completely independent, with c1 = x1 and c2 = x2. We shall show that it is
possible in this case to achieve eﬃcient allocations and yet ti(x) > 0 for all x .
Since α = 1 and ci (= xi) is independent of xj,w eh a v e
ti(ci)=[ π
d − ci]Pr{D|ci} +[ π




(Pr{D|˜ ci} +P r {Mi|˜ ci})d˜ ci.
Note that, for ˜ ci ≤ ˆ c,
Pr{D|˜ ci} = F(ˆ c), Pr{Mi|˜ ci} =1− F(ˆ c), Pr{D|˜ ci} +P r {Mi|˜ ci} =1 ,
and that, for ˜ ci > ˆ c,
Pr{D|˜ ci} =0 , Pr{Mi|˜ ci} =1− F(˜ ci), Pr{D|˜ ci} +P r {Mi|˜ ci} =1− F(˜ ci).
Therefore, for ci > ˆ c,
ti(ci)=[ π
d − ci] 0+[ π
m − ci][1 − F(ci)] −
 ¯ x
ci
[1 − F(˜ ci)]d˜ ci (8)
=[ π
m − ci][1 − F(ci)] + ci[1 − F(ci)] −
 ¯ x
ci





m − ˜ ci]f(˜ ci)]d˜ ci
> 0.
17For ci ≤ ˆ c,
ti(ci)=[ π
d − ci]F(ˆ c)+[ π







[1 − F(˜ ci)]d˜ ci
=[ π
d − ci]F(ˆ c)+[ π
m − ci][1 − F(ˆ c)]
−(ˆ c − ci) −

−ˆ c[1 − F(ˆ c)] +
 ¯ x
ˆ c




m[1 − F(ˆ c)] − ˆ cF(ˆ c) −
 ¯ x
ˆ c









m − ˜ ci]f(˜ ci)d˜ ci.
Note that πd, πm, and ˆ c are all independent of the p.d.f. f(·). Note also that
πd − ˆ c<0, and that πm −c>0 for all c ∈ [x, ¯ x]. Therefore, if the density on [ˆ c, ¯ x]i s
suﬃciently high and the density on [x,ˆ c] is suﬃciently low, we must have ti(ci) > 0
for ci ≤ ˆ c.
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Notes
1Privatization is another case where the issue of market design arises. The question may then be
whether a public enterprise should be sold oﬀ as a single ﬁrm or as several ﬁrms.
2See also McGuire and Riordan (1995), Riordan (1996), and Wolinsky (1997). Chen and Li
(1999) contains a study where ﬁrms’ information is about a pure common value.
183Following the tradition of this literature, we adopt a normative approach and study optimal
mechanisms. An alternative to the normative approach, beginning with the work of Wilson (1979)
on share auctions, is to conduct positive analysis of equilibrium in a speciﬁc auction format with
endogenous number of awards. See, for instance, Anton and Yao (1989, 1992) for split-award auctions
and their use in government procurement.
4Krishna and Perry (2000) have used this objective function in their study of eﬃcient mechanisms
where agents’ private information may be multi-dimensional.
5Full eﬃciency can always be achieved if government revenue is not constrained. When the
government faces the no-deﬁcit constraint and full eﬃciency cannot be obtained, we assume that
the government aims to achieve the highest level of eﬃciency under the constraint that its revenue
is non-negative.
6In Dana and Spier (1994), the government assigns a higher weight on government revenue than
on other components of social welfare, taking into account the taxation distortion in raising public
funds. If we use the same objective function as in Dana and Spier, monopoly licenses would be
issued more often, similar to their result. This is because under monopoly, ﬁrm proﬁts are higher,
and hence more government revenues can be raised.
7Here, we implicitly assume that a ﬁrm is obligated to provide the service (product) if it is
assigned a production license; or, alternatively, the ﬁrm learns its cost realization only after it has
made the production decision.
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2 xFigure 3.  The optimal allocation of licenses when  1   D .
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